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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
KAREN SHUMANN MARCHANT, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
v* ) 
) Supreme Court No. 860498 
DONALD J. MARCHANT, ) 
) Civil No. 85-8-9605-2 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
ooOoo 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
As a result of the trial held June 18 , 1986 before the 
Honorable Don V* Tibbsf Sixth Judicial District Court Judgef 
Karen Shumann Marchant, Appellant, requests that this Court 
review the following issues: 
1. The custody award of the parties1 two minor 
children/ Sara Marchant and Brandon Marchant, to the Respondent/ 
Donald Marchant/ was an abuse of discretion of the Trial Judge. 
2. The evidence offered at trial regarding custody 
does not support the Conclusions of Law that it is in the best 
interests of the children that the Plaintiff be awarded permanent 
custody. 
3. The Trial Court Judge failed to properly apply the 
law to the facts in determining the best interests of the 
children in making the custody award to Donald Marchant, 
4. The Trial Court1s failure to award Karen Marchant 
alimony under the facts presented was an abuse of discretion and 
a misapplication of law to the facts. 
5. The Trial Court's unequal distribution of Donald 
Marchant1s pension plan was an abuse of discretion. 
6. The Trial Court's failure to award $15,000.00 to 
Karen Marchant as separate property, which she had received from 
a personal injury settlement, or its failure to consider the 
amount in the property distribution, was an error in law. 
7. The Trial Court's award of interest on deferred 
payments of the pension plan at less than the statutory rate was 
arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. 
8. The Trial Court's failure to award attorney's fees 
in light of Karen Marchant1s need and Don Marchant's ability to 
pay was an abuse of discretion and a misapplication of law to 
facts. 
STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
The following statutes require interpretation: 
1. Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Ann. (1984, as amended), 
- Attached. 
2. Section 30-3-10 Utah Code Ann. (1977, as amended), 
- Attached. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellant Karen Marchant initiated this divorce pro-
ceeding against her husband of 18 years, Donald Marchant, on 
March 5, 1985, requesting custody of the parties' two minor 
children, Brandon, age 12, and Sara, age 9, child support, ali-
mony and an equitable division of the marital assets. Donald 
Marchant answered, denying that Mrs. Marchant should be awarded a 
divorce or custody of the children. 
Both parties initially moved for temporary custody of 
the children and child support. However, by Stipulation dated 
August 28, 1985 and entered by the Court October 2, 1985, Donald 
Marchant agreed that Karen Marchant should be awarded custody of 
the children subject to his right of visitation, that he would 
pay child support in the amount of $200.00 per month per child, 
that the parties' home in Central, Utah, would be rented and that 
Karen would move to Salt Lake City to reside with the children 
until trial. (A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"; 
Stipulation and Order, Record pp. 17-19.) The Stipulation 
reflected the status quo. Donald Marchant had moved from the 
parties1 home in Central, Utah, in March, 1985 to a trailer home 
at Karen Marchant1s request (Transcript, p. 76). 
Karen Marchant resided in Salt Lake City with the 
children from September, 1985 to June 18, 1986, the date of the 
trial. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce are appended hereto respectively as Exhibits "B" and "C" 
(Record pp. 30-49) . 
The Trial Court granted Karen Marchant's Petition for 
Divorce. However, it found that she was the cause for the mari-
tal breakup (Findings of Fact, para* 5.B., Record p. 32). 
Judge Tibbs granted Respondent Donald Marchant custody 
of Brandon and Sara, based upon the following Findings of Fact: 
5. In determining what is the best interests 
of the children for purposes of determining 
custody, the Court makes the following specific 
findings: 
A. That both the Plaintiff and 
Defendant are good parents, and that both parties 
could be awarded custody of the minor children. 
B. That the marriage entered into bet-
ween Plaintiff and Defendant was broken by the 
actions on the part of the Plaintiff, which were 
not justified. 
C. That when the Plaintiff vacated the 
family home in Central, Utah, and moved to Salt 
Lake City, Utah, in September of 1985, she moved 
into an apartment and in approximately November or 
December of 1985, her sister, another woman who is 
divorced, moved in with her, together with her 
minor child. That the standard of living under 
which Plaintiff has been residing while having the 
temporary custody of the children in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, is not what it should have been nor was 
it in the best interests of the children. 
D. That during the latter part of the 
marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff 
became involved with another man and this fact had 
an influence with the Court in determining what is 
in the best interests of the minor children. 
E. That during the latter years of the 
marriage, Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and that 
change was not in the best interests of the family 
unit, but rather the change was pursuant to the 
Plaintiff's desires and for her benefit to the 
exclusion of the family unit. 
(Record at pp. 31-32) 
Karen was granted visitation of every other weekend/ 
every other holiday and six weeks in the summer, and was required 
to make the children attend church each Sunday while in her care 
(Findings of Fact/ para. 6, Record 33; Decree of Divorce, 
para. 3r Record pp. 42-43). 
No child support was awarded to Donald Marchant (Decree, 
para. 7, Record p. 43). 
The Court found that Karen Marchant was not entitled to 
alimony but made no other specific Findings of Fact on the point. 
(Findings, para. 8, Record p. 33, Decree, para. 5, Record p. 43.) 
The parties1 home in Central, Utah, was awarded to 
Donald Marchant, subject to a lien of one-half of the equity in 
the amount of $17,000.00 in favor of Karen Marchant (Decree, 
para. 6.A., Record p. 43). 
The parties1 farm was determined to have a net equity of 
$43f500.00 which was awarded equally to the parties in the amount 
of $21/750.00 each (Decree, para. 6.B., at p. 44). Defendant was 
ordered to pay Plaintiff $1,500.00 for the farm equipment in his 
possession (Decree, para. 6.C., Record 44). 
To satisfy the awards to the Plaintiff totalling 
$40,250.00, the Court ordered that the farm be sold by June 18, 
1987, and Karen Marchant would be entitled to the first 
$40/250.00 from the sale (Decree, para. 6.D., pp. 45-46). 
Donald Marchant1s pension plan with the United States 
Government Forest Service was found to have a value of $18,000.00 
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which was then vested; the Court awarded Mr, Marchant two-thirds 
of the amount and Mrs. Marchant one-third of the amount, 
requiring Mr. Marchant to pay $6,000.00 over ten years, in one 
annual installment, the unpaid balance bearing interest at eight 
percent per annum (Decree, para. 7, Record 47). 
The Court found that Karen Marchant1s net monthly income 
was $1,321.00 and Don Marchant's was $2,114.00 (Findings, para. 
10, Record p. 37). 
Each party was required to pay the debts which they 
incurred individually from and after October 2, 1985, except that 
Donald Marchant was required to pay medical and dental bills 
incurred by Mrs. Marchant and Sara and Brandon (Decree, para. 9, 
Record 47). 
The Court found that neither party was entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees (Decree, para. 10, Record p. 48). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Donald and Karen Marchant were married September 8, 1967 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, and divorced June 18, 1986, after an 18 
year marriage. At the time of the divorce, Karen was 36 years 
old and Donald was 43 years old. Karen was 18 when they were 
married and had completed one year of college. Karen finished 
one more year of college and quit school to work while her hus-
band completed his education (Transcript, lines 1-11, p. 28). 
Donald obtained a Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering from 
Brigham Young University (Transcript, lines 6-10, p. 71). 
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Donald Marchant went to work for the United States 
Forest Service after graduation, finally being stationed in 
Richfield, Utah. The parties purchased a home in Central, Utah, 
and a farm in Central, Utah, in 1976• The source of the down 
payment of the farm is unclear* Mr. Marchant withdrew monies 
from his retirement (Transcript, lines 15-19, p. 99). Mrs. 
Marchant received a settlement from an automobile accident in the 
amount of $15,000.00, which apparently was applied to the down 
payment as well as mutual debts and a loan to her brother 
(Transcript, lines 1-10, p. 100). 
The Marchants were unable to have children and adopted 
Brandon in April, 1974, at age 2 months and Sara shortly after 
her birth on April 22, 1977. The parties resided in Central, 
Utah, until the marital split in March, 1985. During the 
marriage, both were active in the LDS Church, with Donald 
Marchant serving in two Bishoprics and Karen Marchant serving in 
the Relief Society Presidency. 
Karen Marchant began work for Intermountain Health Care 
in Richfield, Utah, in 1982 (Transcript, lines 4-8, p. 31). 
Prior to that time, she had worked briefly at the start of the 
marriage. Prior to 1982, Karen and her husband had discussed her 
going to work part-time on several occasions. She returned to 
work to help with the debt on the farm. She was also concerned 
that she have a viable skill to earn money for her and her 
children in the event of Donald's death (Transcript, lines 10-19, 
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p. 31). After 1983, Kay Bowden and David Brown, both of whom 
were friends of the Marchants and belonged to the same ward/ 
testified that Mrs* Marchant1s work interfered with her church 
attendance and her goals apparently became more career oriented 
since she spent less time with her family and with them at church 
and social functions (Transcript/ lines 20-25/ p. 120; lines 
1-21/ p* 121; lines 4-20/ p. 124). 
Mrs. Bowden was employed as a teacher's aid at the local 
elementary school (Transcript/ lines 4-5/ p. 115). She testified 
that during the time Donald and Karen were having marital 
problems/ she confronted Karen in her home after a return from a 
business trip. Mrs. Bowden states that Karen's appearance had 
changed and that "everything was for Karen. We were no longer in 
her field." (Transcript/ lines 9-11/ p. 116). She further 
stated that Karen told her she would not work for peanuts like 
Mrs. Bowden was and that "when I leave my homef I leave my home-
made cookies and homemade bread." (Transcript/ lines 15-16/ 
p. 116). Mrs. Bowdenf in concluding her testimony/ stated "I 
just don't think Karen has been fair to us. How long has she 
been faithful to us as a friend? And that's what I feel I'm 
really concerned about." (Transcript/ lines 13-15/ p. 118). 
In response to allegations that her career takes prece-
dence over her family, Mrs. Marchant testified "My career aspira-
tions were to be a wife and a mother. And a job is nice and I am 
grateful I enjoy my work. But I certainly wouldn't term myself a 
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career girl or woman, or whatever• I'm grateful I enjoy my 
work." (Transcript, lines 12-16, p. 60)• 
In March, 1985, Mr. Marchant vacated the parties1 home 
in Central, Utah, at the request of Mrs. Marchant (Transcript, 
lines 10-17, p. 76). During this period, the parties received 
marriage counseling from Dr. Richard Kirkham (Transcript, lines 
5-9, p. 29). Finally, in August, 1985, Karen filed the Petition 
for Divorce and in September, 1985, pursuant to Stipulation 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A", moved to Salt Lake City, Utah 
with the parties1 two children. 
A. Facts Supporting Divorce Petition: 
Mrs. Marchant testified that she and her husband were 
sexually and financially incompatible (Transcript, lines 8-17, 
p. 27). Additionally, in April, 1985, the Marchants engaged in 
an angry argument which resulted in Donald Marchant striking his 
wife and knocking her unconscious (Transcript, pp. 102 and 109). 
She testified that the turning point in her marriage was when her 
husband forced her to have sexual relations the night she 
returned from the hospital after a complicated operation and she 
was very ill (Transcript, lines 23-25, p. 63; lines 1-5, p. 64). 
Mrs. Marchant also stated she did not feel good about the kind of 
control Mr. Marchant tried to exercise in the kinds of clothing 
she wore and was critical of her (Transcript, lines 7-18, p. 54). 
Her husband objected to her sunbathing and going to hot tubs 
"things she'd never gone to before in our marriage" (Transcript, 
lines 18-21, p. 74; lines 1-5, p. 75). 
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Mr. Marchant did not want a divorce and desired recon-
ciliation (Transcript# lines 1-7, p. 21). 
B. Facts Relating to Custody: 
1. Conditions in Salt Lake City. Mrs. Marchant 
had been the primary caretaker of Brandon and Sara during the 
marriage; she continued in this capacity despite her working full 
time both in Central, Utah, and Salt Lake (Defendant's Exhibit 9, 
"Recommendations", p. 3). 
Mrs. Marchant maintained sole custody and control of the 
children from March, 1985, to June 18, 1986, the date of the 
trial. In September, 1985, when Mrs. Marchant moved to Salt Lake 
City, her husband agreed that she take the children with her to 
reside in Salt Lake (Stipulation-Order, Exhibit "A" herein). 
During that period, Mr. Marchant exercised visitation every other 
weekend by taking the children back to Central, Utah, from Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
Sara and Brandon both adjusted well to living in Salt 
Lake and performed well in school and established friends 
(Defendant's Exhibit 9, "Evaluation of Brandon Marchant"; 
"Evaluation of Sara Marchant"). Their scores on report cards 
indicate they maintained or improved grades at William Penn 
Elementary School (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2; Transcript, 
pp. 33-34). 
While in Salt Lake, Mrs. Marchant took the children to 
ballet, concerts, theatre, movies, and hiking; she took skiing 
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lessons with Brandon on the weekends (Transcript, p. 35). 
Brandon had several friends; and Sara enjoyed friendships with 
several children (Transcript, p. 39). 
Elizabeth Stewart, the custody evaluator, stated with 
respect to the living situation in Salt Lake City, a clear pre-
ference for maintaining the status quo: 
Situational factors: 
1. Maintaining a satisfactory custody 
arrangement when the children are happy and well 
adjusted. There is a preference for leaving a 
custody arrangement in place where it is clear that 
they have made a reasonably good adjustment, and 
there is no reason to think that they are not doing 
well or that a different custody arrangement would 
be clearly better for them. In this respect, both 
the Marchant children have adjusted well although it 
is quite clear in observing them with their father 
that they miss him a great deal. It also seems 
likely that Sara's depression and feelings of lone-
liness are related to her father's absence. 
However, if she were living with her father she 
may well feel as sad and lonely because of her 
mother's absence. 
2. The least disruptive placement. Since 
the children are doing well in their mother's 
custody at the present time the least disruptive 
placement would be to leave them in her custody. 
3. Primary caretaker. Although Mrs. 
Marchant has worked full time in recent years, she 
has been the primary caretaker. Mr. Marchant, 
however, has provided direct care also although the 
division of parental responsibility has been quite 
traditional in this family. Mrs. Marchant could 
adapt to being the primary caretaker. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 9, "Recommendation, p. 3) 
Donald Marchant did not like the idea of his children 
being raised in Salt Lake, 
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"Q. Why do you think the chiLdren would be 
better off being raised in Central as opposed to 
Salt Lake? 
A, I think there is more responsibility for 
them there. I do not like the city environment for 
children. I don't like the household environment 
they're in right now. . . . " 
(Transcript, lines 13-19, p. 89) 
Also, Mr. Marchant, in cross-examination, was asked 
about changes he observed in the children since living in Salt 
Lake, He replied: 
"A, I would say more of a worldly approach to 
things, a little slick sophistication. It's hard 
to define. It's they're exposed to a different 
kind of people in Salt Lake. Brandon has attended 
several parties. He has been invited to go to the 
movies with girls and things in Salt Lake and it's 
a different lifestyle." 
(Transcript, lines 7-12, p. 106) 
Donald Marchant testified his wife had not tried to turn 
the children against him while in Salt Lake (Transcript, p. 87). 
Don's activities on every other weekend with the children were 
fishing, hunting, swimming, bowling, boy scout trips, horseback 
riding and rodeos (Transcript/ p. 88). 
2. Living conditions in the duplex. When Mrs. 
Marchant moved to Salt Lake, her sister, Helen, who is divorced 
and has a son, moved in with them in November or December, 1985; 
each person had their own bedroom (Transcript, lines 7-19, 
p. 45). 
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Much has been made of Karen living with Helen, "a divorced 
woman" so the testimony offered regarding Helen and the apartment 
is particularly relevant in light of Finding of Fact 5.C. In 
opening remarks, the Defendant's counsel stated that Mr. Marchant 
was concerned with the living situation in Salt Lake in that Mrs. 
Marchant was living with her sister, whom Mr. Marchant believed 
had "moral problems" (Transcript/ lines 4-8, p. 25). Mr. 
Marchant1s entire testimony regarding Helen is as follows: 
"A. Allusion was made to Helen and her pre-
sence in the home. I don't dislike Helen as a per-
son. I'd like to put that on the record. But I do 
object to her being the mother of my children. 
Q. Why do you think she's a mother to your 
children? 
A. She's home more than Karen and she does 
a lot of mothering as far as I can tell. 
Q. Do you think she is a good or a bad 
influence on the children? 
A. I would have to say bad. 
Q. Why do you say that? 
A. Because her moral values do not coincide 
with what I think is right." 
(Transcript, lines 18-25, p. 89; lines 1-5, p. 90) 
Mrs. Marchant's testimony was that her sister, Helen, 
had a boyfriend, Chuck Moore, who came to the home but never 
stayed overnight (Transcript, lines 6-14, p. 46); that Helen 
occasionally brings alcohol into the duplex but that she has 
discussed Helen's drinking with the children and "they know my 
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standards and their own." (Transcript, lines 8-21, p. 47). She 
also stated that she did not agree with Helen's past rela-
tionships with men but that had changed (Transcript, lines 14-24, 
p. 49). 
Karen's work schedule was leaving home at 7:30 a.m. and 
returning from work at 5:00 p.m. (Transcript, lines 12-21, 
p. 55). When she worked through her lunch, she would arrive home 
at 4:00 p.m. The children left for school at 9:00 a.m. and 
returned at 4:00 p.m. and were cared for by Helen while Karen was 
absent (Transcript, lines 1-22, p. 56). When Karen went out late 
at night, Sara and Brandon were cared for by a twin sister, 
Kathy, who lived close to the duplex. Kathy had children 
approximately the same age as Sara and Brandon (Transcript, lines 
1-9, p. 57). 
In addition to Karen's two sisters and their children 
living in Salt Lake, Karen's mother also resided in Salt Lake; 
additionally, Donald Marchant's parents and Karen Marchant's 
other brother and sister lived in Peoa, Utah (Transcript, lines 
1-10, p. 62), 
C. Facts relating to "involvement with another man** 
A significant dispute between Donald and Karen Marchant 
existed over Karen's friendship with her boss, Doug Fonnesbeck, 
in Richfield, Utah. Conflicting testimony was offered regarding 
the extent of their relationship. Mrs. Marchant was unequivocal 
that nothing beyond a friendship existed and Mr. Marchant 
insisted Karen was in love with him. However, it was clear that 
nothing of a sexual nature ever occurred. Doug Fonnesbeck was 
Karen's immediate supervisor at Intermountain Health Care in 
Richfield, Utah; she first met him when she went to work in 1982 
(Transcript, lines 20-21, p. 50). 
Donald Marchant tied the trouble in his marriage to Doug 
Fonnesbeck. He believed his marriage was in trouble when his 
wife stated what a wonderful man her boss was and that people in 
town were talking about her and her boss (Transcript, lines 
16-23, p. 72). Mr. Marchant testified that he asked her about 
the relationship, and she reportedly stated that there was a 
"sexual attraction" (Transcript, lines 1-3, p. 73). In contrast, 
when asked about the relationship on cross-examination, Karen 
Marchant states: 
"Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Marchant when 
he asked you what the relationship was that you 
might be in love, but it didn't matter because you 
could handle it?" 
A. No. I didn't say that. I said that 
there was a possibility that I could sometime, if 
my situation were different, have liked Mr. 
Fonnesbeck because I find him an interesting per-
son. But that was the extent of it* There was no 
inclination on my part to have a relationship with 
Mr. Fonnesbeck in any way. I was married and com-
mitted to my marriage." 
(Transcript, lines 9-18, p. 52) 
The "relationship" between Karen Marchant and her boss 
was based upon evidence introduced at trial regarding items which 
Mr, Marchant believed were gifts from Doug Fonnesbeck. Mr, 
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Marchant discovered flowers on Karen's desk one day and Karen 
told him they were from her boss; he also discovered flowers in 
her hospital room (Transcript/ lines 7-18, p. 73). On cross-
examination/ Mr. Marchant testified he couldn't tell whether the 
flowers were for National Secretary's Day (Transcript/ lines 1-8/ 
p. 97). Mrs. Marchant stated that the flowers in her hospital 
room were from the office/ generally/ and not Mr. Fonnesbeck 
(Transcript/ lines 3-5/ p. 51). The gifts consisted of a large 
phony diamond ring which Mr. Fonnesbeck gave Karen Marchant as a 
joke at a Christmas party in the Marchant's home when Mr. 
Marchant and all the staff were present (Transcript/ lines 7-23, 
p. 32). Howeverf the ring made Donald Marchant angry when Mrs. 
Marchant wore it (Transcript/ lines 8-14, p. 74). Mr. Fonnesbeck 
also brought her some candy and "trinkets" which Mr. Marchant saw 
on Karen's desk; on occasion/ Mrs. Marchant brought the candy 
home and stated to Mr. Marchant they were a gift from Mr. 
Fonnesbeck (Transcript/ p. 73). 
Karen Marchant gave everyone at her office Valentine's 
Day cards as well as cards on other occasions; she states she 
indicated on Mr. Fonnesbeck's card appreciation for their 
friendship (Transcript/ lines 6-16, p. 51). Donald Marchant 
recalled that he looked at the Valentine in February/ 1984, and 
saw expressions of affection (Transcript/ pp. 94-95); howeverf on 
cross-examination/ he admitted that he had no notes from the card 
and that he only recalled the signature from memory (Transcript/ 
lines 1-12, p. 96). 
Sometime prior to their separation, Karen Marchant met 
Doug Fonnesbeck at a motel suite at Little America in Salt Lake; 
Mr. Fonnesbeck was moving to Logan and was in Salt Lake on busi-
ness and Karen Marchant was in Salt Lake having a medical check-
up after having had a hysterectomy (Transcript, lines 9-21, 
p. 53). They met for approximately one and one-half hours and 
discussed the effect of Mr. Fonnesbeck moving to Logan on Karen 
Marchant's employment in Richfield (Transcript, lines 14-25, 
p. 32; lines 1-5, p. 33). She further stated that she had never 
been unfaithful to her husband (Transcript/ lines 6-7, p. 33). 
Mrs. Marchant disclosed the meeting at Little America to Mr. 
Marchant. Mr. Marchant states that at the time of disclosure, 
Mrs. Marchant said she and Mr. Fonnesbeck had no physical rela-
tionship but they had expressed love for one another (Transcript, 
lines 1-9, p. 76). 
Additionally, Karen Marchant went on a trip with the 
Fonnesbeck1s entire family to Lake Powell (Transcript, lines 
20-24, p. 54). 
In summary, no romantic relationship was shown to have 
existed, and at most, a trusting friendship* 
D. Psychological Evaluation. 
Elizabeth Stewart performed the custodial evaluation on 
Mr. and Mrs. Marchant, Brandon and Sara. Mr. and Mrs. Marchant 
are rated as equal in their caretaking ability and the children 
have expressed no preference for either parent. Equal degrees of 
bonding exist- The custody evaluator concludes as follows: 
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"The custody decision will clearly have to be 
made in view of other factors which are not covered 
by the custody evaluation. Both parents truly have 
the best interests of their children at heart and 
the children clearly need continuing the rela-
tionships with both parents." 
(Defendant's Exhibit 9, "Recommendations", p. 4) 
E. Financial Status of Parties. 
Karen Marchant earned $1,750.00 gross and $1,321.00 net 
per month from her employment at the time of the divorce 
(Transcript, lines 17-21, p. 10). Donald Marchant earned 
$2,908.00 gross and $2,114.00 per month net from his employment 
with the United States Forest Service (Transcript, lines 1-12, 
p. 11). 
The division of the marital assets is set forth at pages 
4-5 herein. The Court, except for the pension plan, divided the 
assets equally between the parties and required payment to Mrs. 
Marchant of her equity of $40,250.00 from the sale of the farm 
(Decree, para. 6.D., p. 45, Record). 
The expenses of each party was submitted at trial in the 
form of exhibits based upon the cost of living when Karen had 
custody of the children and Donald had visitation rights. To the 
extent that the shift in custody altered expenses, the exhibits 
are inaccurate. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 (attachhed hereto as 
Exhibit "D") shows Karen Marchant expenses as $2,220.00; however, 
at trial, Karen Marchant testified that medical and dental bills 
were to be paid 100% by her employment and, therefore, the net 
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expenses should be reduced by $125.00 (Transcript, lines 18-21, 
p. 40). Her sister, Helen, paid two-fifths of the $550.00 rent, 
two-fifths of the $135.00 utility bill and one-half of the $40.00 
telephone bill, reducing her overall expenses by $294.00 
(Transcript, lines 14-25, p. 48; lines 1-10, p. 49). Her 
expenses after these deductions were $1,801.00. 
Donald Marchantfs expenses, with child support and 
travel to pick up the kids, equalled $2,370.00 (Defendant's 
Exhibit 10, attached hereto as Exhibit "E"). The child support 
monthly payment was $400.00 and travel expenses to exercise visi-
tation was $300.00, which probably should be reduced from Mr. 
Marchant1s total expense sheet. Donald Marchant testified his 
trailer was on consignment in Salt Lake for sale and would addi-
tionally reduce his monthly expenses by $165.00 (Transcript, 
lines 23-25, p. 76). 
Donald Marchant testified Mrs. Marchant had received two 
personal injury settlements totaling $20,000; the $15,000 settle-
ment was used to pay the farm, pay marital debts and make a loan 
to Karen's brother (Transcript, lines 23-25, p. 99; lines 1-10, 
p. 100). 
Mr. Marchant was required to pay debts incurred during 
the marriage which were as follows: 
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Amount 
320.00 
65.00 
65.00 
50.00 
Balance Due 
11,000.00 
1,200.00 
1,300.00 
14,000.00 
2,000.00 
1,300.00 
Description 
Truck 
Visa 
Master Charge 
Loan, M. A, Marchant 
Farm Loan, Zions Bank 
Personal Loan 
Mr. Marchant testified that the $14,000.00 loan was from 
his father and that he did not sign a Promissory Note, but it was 
due "when he could get it" (Transcript, lines 6-15, p. 104). The 
other payments on marital obligations were already included in 
his monthly expenses. Therefore, he had no additional debt 
increase as a result of the Decree. 
Mr. Marchant testified that his pension plan was valued 
at $18,000.00 and was currently vested at the time of trial 
(Transcript, lines 17-25, p. 66; lines 1-12, p. 67). 
Regarding alimony, Karen Marchant stated that she 
desires to return to school and complete her education and that 
schooling cost approximately $135.00 per semester hour; she esti-
mated she would need $200.00 per month as alimony (Transcript/ 
p. 43). 
F. Courts Findings and Rulings. 
Judge Tibbs "Findings and Rulings'" from the Transcript 
are attached hereto as Exhibit "F". His statements and rulings 
reflect significant bias against divorcing women generally and 
Mrs. Marchant specifically. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The remarks, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by 
Judge Donald V. Tibbs show bias towards divorcing women generally 
and Karen Marchant specifically. 
1. THE FACTORS SET FORTH BY THE TRIAL COURT IN 
DETERMININING THE "BEST INTERESTS" OF THE CHILDREN IN THE CUSTODY 
AWARD SHOW THE COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW LEGAL STANDARDS ESTABLISHED 
IN UTAH FOR CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS, DO NOT SET FORTH A RATIONAL 
OR LOGICAL BASIS FOR MAKING THE AWARD TO MR. MARCHANT AND 
TERMINATING LONG TIME TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF MRS. MARCHANT, AND DO 
NOT REFLECT THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE "BEST 
INTERESTS" OF THE CHILDREN WERE BETTER SERVED BY MAINTAINING MRS. 
MARCHANT AS THE CUSTODIAL PARENT. 
2. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT MRS. MARCHANT MET THE 
LEGAL STANDARD FOR BEING AWARDED ALIMONY IN THAT HER INCOME WAS 
LESS THAN HER EXPENSES, DONALD MARCHANT'S EARNING POWER AND 
INCOME GREATLY EXCEEDED KAREN MARCHANT'S, MRS. MARCHANT DESIRED 
TO RETURN TO SCHOOL AND THE PARTIES HAD BEEN MARRIED 18 YEARS 
DURING WHICH TIME MRS. MARCHANT REMAINED IN THE HOME AS A 
HOUSEWIFE. 
3. UTAH LAW REQUIRES THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER, IN 
DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS, ALL PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING THE 
COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE; THE COURT GAVE NO CONSIDERATION OR CREDIT 
TO MRS. MARCHANT FOR PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS OF $20,000.00 WHICH 
WERE CONTRIBUTED TO THE MARRIAGE. 
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4. THE COURT'S AWARD OF 100% OF THE RETIREMENT PLAN TO 
MR. MARCHANT AND ONE-THIRD THAT AMOUNT TO MRS. MARCHANT WAS 
INEQUITABLE IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 
MARRIAGE, AND THE COURT'S FAILURE TO AWARD ALIMONY, ATTORNEY'S 
FEES OR CREDIT MRS. MARCHANT FOR PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Karen Marchant decided, after years of an unhappy 
marriage, that she should get a divorce. The decision came after 
sexual incompatibility, financial incompatibility and constant 
jealous rage and anger by her husband. For this decision, Judge 
John Tibbs deprived her of the custody of her children, Sara and 
Brandon. As further penalties, he refused to award her alimony 
after an 18 year marriage or attorney's fees, despite her earning 
a little more than 60% of her husband's income during her relati-
vely recent employment. 
Judge Tibbs' punitive attitude towards Mrs. Marchant is 
apparent in his remarks at the conclusion of the trial and his 
Findings of Fact regarding the custody issue. In his closing 
remarks, Judge Tibbs rails over the young criminals who are the 
product of a broken home, asserting that every criminal who comes 
before him for sentencing has divorced parents. Further, Judge 
Tibbs states: 
"I'll be honest. I have difficulty with what 
the Plaintiff (Karen Marchant) sues. Alleges 
grounds. I have difficulty finding that this 
Defendant's done anything wrong, other than 
slapping her. Maybe that was justified. I don't 
believe in it. I don't believe anyone should use 
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force and violence. But I am having difficulty. 
(Transcript, p. 130) 
This "difficulty" exists despite Mrs. Marchant1s testi-
mony and Mr. Marchant*s testimony of sexual incompatibility/ that 
they had not engaged in sexual relations for more than two years 
prior to the divorce, had one year of marital counseling prior to 
the divorcef and that Mr. Marchant had forced her to have sex 
with him the night she returned home from the hospital after an 
operation for infertility and she was extremely ill. Further, 
Karen Marchant testified that her husband was constantly jealous 
and that in a fit of anger he had hit and knocked her 
unconscious. No doubt Mr. Marchant is a good fellow but saying 
that there is no basis for the divorce goes to the point of high-
lighting an apparent bias against divorcing women generally. 
That bias is explicit in the Findings of Fact where the 
Judge states that a basis for awarding custody of the children to 
Mr. Marchant is that Mrs. Marchant moved into an apartment and 
"her sister, another woman who is divorced, moved in with her, 
together with her minor child." (Transcript, p. 135). 
Although the appealable errors are based generally upon 
misapplication of law to facts, the various rulings are made 
increasingly questionable by Judge Tibbs1 attitude towards Mrs. 
Marchant as evidenced by his statements and the shallowness of 
the basis of his decision on the custody issue. It is apparent 
his decision is solely against Mrs. Marchant on that point and 
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not in favor of the "best interests" of the Brandon and Sara 
Marchant. 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO DONALD MARCHANT 
Judge Tibbs abused his discretion in awarding the 
parties1 minor children to Donald Marchant. The evidence 
strongly shows the Judge should have maintained the existing 
custodial award rather than changing its prior Orders. Although 
a Trial Court Judge is granted broad discretion in making custody 
determination Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah, 1975), a Court 
must apply legal standard to the decision making process which 
rationally relate to the ultimate conclusions in the custody 
process- Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah, 1986). It is 
particularly because of this broad discretion that Trial Court 
Judges must carefully weigh a variety of facts and look to 
established legal guidelines in arriving at proper conclusions. 
In the instant case, the Trial Court totally failed in its 
charge. 
A. Legal Standards in Custody Determination. 
A Trial Court must make custody awards based upon the 
"best interests" of the children. Section 30-3-10, Utah Code 
Ann. (1977, as amended). A child custody proceeding is equitable 
in nature and must be based primarily and foremost on the 
"welfare and interest of the minor children". Kallas v. Kallas, 
614 P,2d 641, 645 (Utah, 1980). 
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On numerous occasions, this Court has set forth factors 
which should be considered in arriving at conclusions regarding 
the "best interests" of the children* In Hutchinson v. 
Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah, 1982), this Court stated: 
"Some factors the Court may consider in deter-
mining the child's best interests relate primarily 
to the child's feelings or special needs: the pre-
ference of the child; keeping siblings together; 
the relative strength of the child's bond with one 
or both of the prospective custodians; and, in 
appropriate cases, the general interests in con-
tinuing previously determined custody arrangements 
where the child is happy and well adjusted. 
(Citations omitted) i 
Other factors relate primarily to the prospective 
custodians' character or status or to their capa-
city or willingness to function as parents; moral 
character and emotional stability; duration and 
depth of desire for custody; ability to provide 
personal rather than surrogate care; significant 
impairment of ability to function as a parent 
through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other 
cause; reasons for having relinquished custody in 
the past; religious compatibility with the child; 
kinship, including, in extraordinary circumstances, 
stepparent status; and financial condition." 
(Citations omitted) At p.41. i 
This Court has, on occasion, highlighted factors which 
are most importantly considered in custody determinations. 
"We believe that the choice in competing child 
custody claims should instead be based on function-
related factors. Prominent among these, though not 
exclusive, is the identity of the primary caretaker 
during the marriage. Other factors should include 
the identity of the parent with greater flexibility 
to provide personal care for the child and the 
identify of the parent with whom the child has 
spent most of his or her time pending custody 
determination if that period has been lengthy. 
Another important factor should be the stability of 
the environment provided by each parent." 
Citing Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child 
Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 
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Fam.L.Q.I (Spring, 1984). Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 
117# 120 (Utah, 1986). 
Assessment of the applicability and relative weight of 
these various factors in a particular case lie within the sound 
discretion of the Trial Court. Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, supra 
at 41. However, a Court may not arbitrarily substitute factors 
which are not functionally related to the "best interests of the 
child". Smith v. Smith, supra. 
B. Judge Tibbs Misapplied the Law in Making the 
Custody Determination. 
The Findings of Fact entered by the Trial Court show the 
complete misapplication of law in this case. The Findings show 
no sufficient basis whatsoever for terminating Karen's temporary 
custody which existed for 15 months prior to the divorce and 
awarding permanent custody to her husband. This Court has 
recently held that Findings of Fact must demonstrate a rational 
factual basis for the ultimate decision of custody award by 
references to pertinent factors that relate to the best interests 
of the child, including specific attributes of the parents. 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah, 1986). 
The Findings of Fact in this case are not logical, do 
not relate to the best interests of the children, show bias and 
prejudice on the part of the Trial Court Judge and, in some 
instances, are not supported by the evidence in the record. 
1. Finding of Fact 5.A, "That both the Plaintiff 
and Defendant are good parents, and that both parties could be 
awarded custody of the minor children." 
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The Trial Court here recognizes the equality of the 
parties as confirmed in the Elizabeth Stewart custody evaluations 
wherein she makes no preference by way of recommendation for 
custody in either party. However, the Trial Court makes no 
further reference to important factors examined by the custody 
evaluatorf especially the preference for maintaining the status 
quo with Karen Marchant as the custodial parent and the fact that 
the least disruptive placement would be maintaining custody with 
Mrs. Marchant. (Defendant's Exhibit 9f "Recommendations" p. 3). 
2* Finding of Fact 5.B. "That the marriage 
entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant was broken by the 
actions on the part of the Plaintiff/ which were not justified." 
This Finding of Fact flies directly in the face of 
granting Plaintiff the divorce on grounds of mental cruelty and 
is not supported by the record. To the contrary/ Karen Marchant 
testified of unhappiness in her marriage which she believed began 
at the time when her husband/ Donald Marchant/ forced her to have 
sexual relations the night she arrived home from the hospital 
after an operation for infertility when she was feeling very ill. 
She further testified of years of sexual incompatibility/ of her 
husband's jealousy and anger of her outside relationships and 
activities and of other emotional incompatibility. Additionally/ 
both Mr. and Mrs. Marchant testified of the incident when Mr. 
Marchant angrily struck Mrs. Marchant/ knocking her unconscious. 
Finally/ the Finding of Fact does not relate in any 
respect to the best interests of the children. It rather 
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reflects a punitive view of the Trial Court that Donald Marchant 
is a deserving man and Karen Marchant1s extreme difficulty during 
the course of the marriage are not worthy of being deemed 
"justification" for divorce, 
3, Finding of Fact 5.C. "That when the Plaintiff 
vacated the family home in Central, Utah, and moved to Salt Lake 
City, Utah, in September of 1985, she moved into an apartment and 
in approximately November or December of 1985, her sister, 
another woman who is divorced, moved in with her, together with 
her minor child- That the standard of living under which 
Plaintiff has been residing while having the temporary custody of 
the children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what it should have 
been nor was it in the best interests of the children." 
The Judge's bias against a divorcing or divorced 
woman is underscored by his making reference to Mrs. Marchant 
living with "another woman who is divorced". There is no other 
basis why this is a salient factor for his consideration in 
custody determination. The testimony regarding Karen Marchant1s 
sister, Helen, provided no basis upon which the Court could find 
that this "divorced woman" should be a significant factor. 
Donald Marchant testified that he did not think Helen would be a 
good influence on his children "because her moral values don't 
coincide with what I think is right". (Transcript, line 4-5, p. 
90). No other evidence was offered which plausibly could 
discredit Karen's sister. 
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The finding that "the standard of living . . . is 
not what it should have been nor was it in the best interests of 
the children" is not supported by the record and is vague. Karen 
Marchant testified that each of the parties lived in separate 
bedrooms, that her social life revolved around taking the 
children to concertsf theatre# movies, skiing and other activi-
ties. Elizabeth Stewart's psychological evaluations of Brandon 
Marchant and Sara Marchant indicate both are reasonably well 
adjusted in the environment and there is nothing adverse about 
the living conditions, except the absence of their father 
(Defendant's Exhibit 9). Karen Marchant's absence from the 
duplex in Salt Lake was work-related and she is home each day 
between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. and her sister provides the care 
during her absence when the children are not in school. Donald 
Marchant testified that he was not aware of any time during the 
period they were in Salt Lake City when Sara and Brandon did not 
have food, shelter and clothing or were not adequately cared for. 
(Transcript, lines 1-8, p. 107) 
In short, this unsupported and vague Finding of 
Fact does not provide a rational basis upon which the Court made 
its custody determination. 
4. Finding of Fact 5.D. "That during the latter 
part of the marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff 
became involved with another man and this had an influence with 
the Court in determining what is the best interests of the minor 
children." 
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Karen Marchant1s "involvement" with Doug Fonnesbeck 
was shown to be no more than on a friendship level. Mrs. 
Marchant testified that she liked her boss as a friend, found him 
interesting and trusted him. She testified that there was no 
romantic or sexual involvement. No evidence was introduced to 
the contraryf although Mr. Marchant stated that he had seen 
flowers, a couple of other gifts like candy and the famous ring 
incident where Fonnesbeck gave Mrs. Marchant a phony diamond at a 
Christmas party with Intermountain Health Care staff in the 
Marchant1s home. Karen Marchant voluntarily brought home candy 
and disclosed that it was from her boss and also voluntarily 
disclosed her meeting in Salt Lake with Doug Fonnesbeck. These 
voluntary disclosures are contrary to any significant sexual or 
romantic involvement. However, beyond that/ the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that even in the most extreme instances of 
flagrant sexual involvement, in order to be considered as a 
factor in custody determinations/ the relationship must be shown 
to be adverse to the best interests of the children. Shioji v. 
Shioji/ 671 P.2d 135 (Otah# 1983); Kallas v. Kallasf 614 P.2d 641 
(Utah/ 1980). 
The declaration that her "involvement with another 
man" influenced the Court is patent affirmation of the Court 
ignoring traditional factors of either parents1 positive or nega-
tive attributes/ caretaking abilities/ or environmental con-
ditions which may play a role in appropriate child rearing 
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process. The Court's findings essentially negate the possibility 
of a woman having any friendship relationship with a man who is 
not her husband at the risk of losing her children in a child 
custody battle. Further, it may have been the case that the 
relationship could have been a very positive factor with respect 
to the best interests of the children but no further finding is 
evident on that point. 
5* Finding of Fact 5.E. "That during the latter 
years of the marriage, Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and that 
change was not in the best interests of the family unit, but 
rather the change was pursuant to Plaintiff's desires and for her 
benefit to the exclusion of the family unit." 
It is accurate that Karen Marchant decided, after 
some years of an unhappy marriage, that she no longer wanted to 
be married to Donald Marchant which certainly does not promote 
"the best interests of the family unit". However, Mrs. Marchant 
again is being penalized for exercising her right to obtain a 
divorce rather than this being a factor which relates to either 
her or Donald Marchant*s ability to care for and raise Sara and 
Brandon Marchant. The only "lifestyle" change in the latter 
years of the marriage was that in 1982, Karen Marchant decided to 
go to work. Her testimony on that point was that she felt a 
clear economic need to reduce the indebtedness which had been 
incurred with the purchase of the farm and that as a result of 
her experience as a child when her father died leaving her mother 
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with eight children to rearf she felt a clear need to have a 
vocation upon which to rely in the event of her husband1s death. 
She continued as the primary caretaker of Sara and Brandon 
Marchant while working. The record is void of any characteristic 
of her lifestyle which would adversely effect the best interests 
of the children, such as drug or alcohol abuse, illicit rela-
tionships with men in the presence of the children, adverse 
psychological traits, or other negative "lifestyle" factors. Her 
behavior is simply consistent with a person who had made the 
decision to obtain a divorce which should not preponderate 
against her on a child custody issue. 
In conclusion, the Trial Court wholly failed to 
provide a "rational factual basis for the ultimate decision by 
reference to pertinent factors that relate to the best interests 
of the child11. Smith v. Smith, supra, at 426. The Court 
employed none of the factors outlined in Hutchinson, supra, in 
making the award. 
C. The Court Should Have Awarded the Parties1 Children 
to Karen Marchant* 
Under Pusey v. Pusey, supra, and Hutchinson v. 
Hutchinson, supra, the factors therein dictate that the Trial 
Court should have awarded custody of Brandon and Sara Marchant to 
Karen Marchant. Under Pusey, "prominent11 considerations relate 
to the primary caretaker during marriage and the person with whom 
the children have spent their time during the determination of 
custody. Karen Marchant, up until her employment of 1982, had 
been almost the sole caretaker of the children while she was at 
home as a housewife and her husband worked. After 1982, she con-
tinued as the primary caretaker. (Defendant's Exhibit 9, 
"Recommendations", para. 3). Donald Marchant moved out of the 
parties1 home in Central, Utah, in March, 1985, and from March, 
1985, to September, 1985, Karen Marchant was the primary care-
taker in Central, Utah. From September, 1985, to June, 1986, 
Karen Marchant maintained custody in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
These factors become increasingly more prominent where 
the custody evaluator has not recommended custody in either 
party. In fact, the change in custody from Mrs. Marchant to Mr. 
Marchant becomes more puzzling in light of the custody evaluator 
indicating that "there is a preference for leaving the custody 
arrangement in place where it is clear that they have made a 
reasonably good adjustment and there is no reason to think that 
they are not doing well or that a different custody arrangement 
would be better for them." Further, the evaluator states "since 
the children are doing well in their mother's custody at the pre-
sent time the least disruptive placement would be to leave them 
in her custody." (Defendant's Exhibit 9, "Recommendations" 
p. 3). 
There is simply no evidence in the record which pointed 
to disturing the custody arrangement after the children had 
attended one full year at William Penn Elementary School in Salt 
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Lake City, Utah, had become well adjusted to the Salt Lake City 
condition and environment, had gained friends. This is espe-
cially true in light of the childrens1 familial ties through 
Karen Marchant's mother, two sisters and their families living in 
Salt Lake, and Don Marchant's and Karen Marchant's brother and 
sister and parents living in Peoa, Utah, which is nearby. In 
fact, during working hours, Mrs. Marchant had a preferable care-
taker in her sister, Helen, who was a close relative and could 
provide care and nurturing on a familial basis. That evidence is 
opposed to Donald Marchant's testimony who stated that on a 
theoretical basis he would obtain some "good ladies" from the 
neighborhood to care for the children while he was at work and 
they had returned home from school, or in the alternative, during 
summer months when he was at work (Transcript, lines 1-12, 
p. 91). He could only make statements on an assumed basis and 
could provide no practical experience. 
On a variety of other factors, the best interests of the 
children would have been equally well served by awarding custody 
to either party in that no strong preponderance occurred from 
character traits, caretaking abilities, child preference or emo-
tional stability. The factors set forth by the Court as weighing 
importantly in its custody determination were strongly outweighed 
by the factors discussed in Pusey v. Pusey, supra. 
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D. The Court Abused its Discretion in Custody 
Determination. 
Based upon the Court's apparent prejudice/ its lack of 
consideration or explication of appropriate factors/ its failure 
to apply the law, and the positive factors which preponderate in 
favor of Karen Marchant having continued custody of Sara and 
Brandon Marchant, it is apparent that the Court abused its 
discretion. As the Court has traditionally held and recently 
stated: 
"This Court will not overturn a Trial Court's 
custody determination on appeal unless the evidence 
clearly shows that the custody determination was 
not in the best interests of the child or that the 
Trial Court misapplied applicable principles of 
law." (Citation omitted) Smith v. Smith, at 425. 
This case is one of those clear instances when the Court abused 
its discretion and should be reversed. 
II. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING 
TO AWARD KAREN MARCHANT ALIMONY 
The Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to 
award Karen Marchant alimony in that she clearly met the tradi-
tional legal standard required for an award of alimony. The 
Court entered no Findings of Fact on the point other than Mrs. 
Marchant is not entitled to alimony. The evidence supports that 
after an 18 year marriage to the Defendant, alimony should have 
been awarded. 
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A. Applicable Standard for Alimony Determination, 
This Court, on numerous occasions, has held that the 
most important function of alimony is to support for wife as 
nearly as possible to the standard of living she enjoyed during 
the marriage, Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah, 1985); 
Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah, 1983); English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah, 1977), 
With this purpose in mind, the Trial Court must consider 
three factors in making a reasonable alimony award: 
1. The financial conditions and needs of the 
wife; 
2. The ability of the wife to produce a suf-
ficient income for herself; and 
3. The ability of the husband to provide support, 
Jones v. Jones, supra, at 1075; English v. English, supra, at 
411-12; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah, 1980); 
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P,2d 144, 147 (Utah, 1978), 
B. The Facts Warrant Awarding Alimony to Karen 
Marchant, 
The living conditions of the Marchants prior to the 
marital breakup, the economic earning powers of the parties and 
their relative needs strongly show that the Court should have 
awarded alimony. Don and Karen Marchant were married 18 years at 
the time of divorce, Karen had quit college to support Don while 
he obtained his Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering at 
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Brigham Young University. Karen worked only during the first few 
years of the marriage and then from 1974 to 1982 cared full time 
for the parties1 children. In 1982 she went to work as a secre-
tary in that she had no other skills upon which she could rely or 
significant educational experience by way of a degree. Don 
Marchant testified that his gross annual income was $37,000.00 
per year or $2,908.00 gross and $2,114.00 net. Karen Marchant1s 
employment produced approximately $21,000.00 per year gross, 
$1,750.00 per month gross and $1,350.00 per month net. Prior to 
the marital breakup, the parties lived in a home in Central, 
Utah, which was awarded to Don Marchant. In light of Don 
Marchant1s engineering degree and longevity with the United 
States Forest Service, his earning power is significantly greater 
than Mrs. Marchant1s. This Court has held: 
"Where a marriage is of long duration and the 
earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds that 
of the other, as here, is appropriate to order ali-
mony and child support at a level which will insure 
that the support spouse and children may maintain a 
standard of living not unduly disproportionate to 
that which they would have enjoyed had the marriage 
continued." Savage v. Savage, 685 P.2d 1201, 1205 
(Utah, 1983). 
Mrs. Marchant testified and submitted her exhibit 
showing that her expenses were $1,801.00, which is $470.00 
greater than her net income. (Transcript, lines 17-21, p. 10; 
lines 18-21, p. 4; Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.) Reducing her expenses 
for the absence of the children by deducting the child care of 
$100,00 and school expenses of $80.00, she is still $290.00 
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short. Don Marchant1s expenses are a total $2,370.00; however, 
this included a monthly support payment of $400.00 and travel 
expenses to exercise visitation of $300.00 which should be 
deducted out, leaving expenses of $1,670.00. Also, Mr. Marchant 
testified with respect to the $165.00 per month payment on the 
trailer, that it was on consignment in Salt Lake and should imme-
diately be sold which would reduce his monthly expenses to 
$1,505.00. 
Mrs. Marchant testified that she desired to return to 
school and gain further education which would cost $135.00 per 
semester hour. She estimated that she would need approximately 
$200.00 per month in alimony to obtain that education. 
Although Mrs. Marchant was awarded marital assets which 
would theoretically produce income upon the sale which was 
ordered by June, 1987, division of marital assets is an 
inappropriate measure of alimony. The Court has held: 
"The standard utilized by the Trial Court, 
i.e. the length of the marriage and contributions 
of each to their joint financial success, is not an 
appropriate measure to determine alimony. There is 
a distinction between the division of assets accu-
mulated during marriage, which should be distri-
buted upon an equitable basis, and the post-marital 
duty of support and maintenance." 
English v. English, supra, at 411. Also see Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, at 1223 (Utah, 1980). 
In light of the disparate earning capacities of Mr. and 
Mrs. Marchant, their expenses and needs, his ability to pay and 
her current and future needs, it is apparent she unqualifiably 
met the requirements for being awarded alimony. 
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C. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Award 
Alimony* 
This Court has stated that it will not disturb an award 
of alimony unless there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion. Dority v. Pority, 645 P.2d 56, at 59 (Utah, 1982). 
However, the Court's failure to observe this Court's standard for 
awarding alimony in the instant case is apparent. In the Court's 
Memorandum Decision, and its Findings of Fact, there is no record 
of any analysis performed by the Court of the three factors which 
warranted granting Mrs. Marchant alimony. As we have suggested 
before, this may, in part, be due to a punitive attitude on the 
part of the Trial Court to Mrs. Marchant's move to obtain a 
divorce where the Trial Court felt that her actions were not 
justified. However, this Court, while sitting in equity, has the 
ability to independently review the record and make its own 
conclusions. Jones v. Jones, supra, at 1075. The Court in 
Jones, applying the standard set forth above, held that the Trial 
Court abused its discretion in failing to award an appropriate 
amount of alimony. The evidence before the Court clearly shows 
that the Trial Court abused its discretion by not granting 
reasonable alimony to Karen Marchant. 
III. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER PERSONAL INJURY AWARD TO KAREN MARCHANT 
IN ITS DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS 
There is no evidence in the record that Judge Tibbs con-
sidered the total of $20,000.00 awarded to Karen Marchant from 
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two personal injury accidents. According to Mr- Marchant's 
testimony, he was unclear as to the portion of the $15,000.00 
award which was contributed by Karen to purchase the farm; 
however, he states that a portion went to pay mutual debts, 
purchased personal items and some was loaned to Karen's brother 
(Transcript, lines 1-10, p. 110). The record reflects that it 
was a separate award to Karen Marchant. 
A. Legal Standard in Assessing Division of Marital 
Assets. 
Interpretation and construction of Section 30-3-5, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended) requires the Trial Court to consider 
the entirety of each parties1 assets and how they were acquired 
and their use during the course of the marriage. In Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah, 1982), the Trial Court awarded the 
wife a percentage of the husband's retirement fund. The husband 
appealed contending the pension plan should not be included in 
property distribution in that the income was to be received in 
the future. Using an analysis which is particularly appropriate 
in the instant case, this Court stated: 
"If the rights to those benefits are acquired 
during the marriage/ then the Court must at least 
consider those benefits in making an equitable 
distribution of marital assets." Woodward, at 
p. 432. 
The Court cited prior case law for the proposition that 
all assets brought into the marriage, all assets acquired during 
the marriage, from whatever source, must be considered when 
making an equitable distribution: 
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"In Englart v. Englartf Utah, 576 P.2d 1274 
(1978), we emphasize the equitable nature of pro-
ceedings dealing with the family, pointing out that 
the Court may take into consideration all of the 
pertinent circumstances. The circumstances encom-
pass all of the assets of every nature possessed by 
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever 
source derived . . . .,f Woodward at p. 432. 
More recently, in upholding a division of marital pro-
perty where sixty percent (60%) of the estate was awarded to the 
wife and forth percent (40%) to the husband, the Utah Supreme 
Court considered it a prominent factor that the wife had used 
proceeds from the sale of her home to purchase the parties' ori-
ginal home in Park City, Utah, Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 
(Utah, 1982). Accord Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah, 1982). 
In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah, 1980), the husband 
(Defendant) appealed an award splitting the marital estate fifty-
five percent (55%) in favor of his wife and forty-five percent 
(45%) to him, claiming abuse of discretion. Upholding the Trial 
Court's award, the Court stated: 
"The Trial Court had before it testimony that 
Plaintiff had not been gainfully employed outside 
the home for nearly 22 years and her skills were in 
clerical and sales work. On the other hand, the 
Defendant had a well established profession netting 
him in excess of $40,000.00 per year. The fact 
that, due to her willingness to work while he 
attended school, Plaintiff has not increased her 
earning capacity to the same extent as had the 
Defendant, speaks in favor of the Trial Court's 
distribution." 
"Furthermore, it was undisputed that Plaintiff 
contributed $10,000.00 from her own separate funds 
to completely furnish the first home of the parties 
and when that home was sold and their current home 
was purchased, many of those furnishings were moved 
to and are still in the new residence. Plaintiff 
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contributed another $5,000.00 of her own funds in 
1967 to retire the mortgage on this residence. In 
view of these undisputed facts, the Trial Court did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding a greater por-
tion of the marital property to the Plaintiff than 
to the Defendant." Kerr, at 1382-83. 
B. The Personal Injury Awards to Karen Marchant Should 
be Considered to Recompute the Division of the Marital Assets. 
In each of the cases cited above, the Court upheld divi-
sion of marital assets which, in some instances, dispropor-
tionately favored the party contributing a significant amount of 
money or assets to the marital estate. However, in this case, 
the larger portion of the assets were awarded to Donald Marchant. 
The Trial Court made no consideration of the personal injury 
award to Karen Marchant in its division of the marital assets 
which is apparent from its dividing all of the property, except 
for the pension plan, fifty percent (50%) to Don Marchant and 
fifty percent (50%) to Karen Marchant. The inequity worked 
against Mrs. Marchant is apparent from the property award. 
Further, it cannot be claimed that she is being compensated on 
another level in that she was not awarded alimony or attorney's 
fees. Therefore, the Court's failure to consider the personal 
injury award is a misapplication of the law which results in 
substantial prejudice. 
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IV. 
FAILURE TO AWARD KAREN MARCHANT ONE-HALF OF THE RETIREMENT 
BENEFITS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
A* Equity Requires at Least an Equal Distribution of 
the Marital Assets. 
In distributing marital assets, a variety of equitable 
concerns must be considered by the Court such as the fifteen spe-
cific factors stated in McDonald v. McDonald, 236 P.2d 1066, at 
1070 (Utah, 1951). The Trial Court has broad discretion entering 
its Orders. In commenting on the Trial Court's discretion, this 
Court has stated: 
"When a marriage has failed/ a court's duty is 
to consider the various factors relating to the 
situation and to arrange the best possible alloca-
tion of the property and the economic resources of 
the parties so that the parties and their children 
can pursue their lives in as happy and useful a 
manner as possible." Read v. Ready 594 P.2d 871 
(Utah, 1979). 
In accordance with equitable considerations, Karen 
Marchant should have been awarded at least fifty percent (50%) of 
Donald Marchant's retirement plan to maintain at least a fifty-
fifty split of the marital assets. During the majority of the 
time Donald Marchant worked for the U.S. Forest Service, Karen 
was at home raising the children. Her activities as a housewife 
during those several years warrant consideration in his accumula-
tion of retirement benefits. Further, during the short period of 
time she has been employed, she has received no accumulation of 
benefits other than social security income. Other factors are 
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that the Court failed to include consideration for the personal 
injury awards which were contributed to the marriage, no award of 
alimony or attorney's fees. The Trial Court was in a unique 
position to consider the parties, their children, their incomes 
and accumulated property. However, viewing the overall division 
of property, it is apparent that the Court strongly favored 
Donald Marchant when equitable considerations would dictate 
otherwise. 
B. The Court Failed to Consider the Terms of the Civil 
Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984 for Alternative 
Distribution. 
Under the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 
1984 (Pub. L. No. 95-615, 92 Stat. 3195, 1984, amending 5 U.S.C. 
Section 8331, 8339, 8345, 8901 et jseg. ) , the Court could have 
provided that Karen Marchant be made an alternative beneficiary 
for all benefits due under the Civil Service Retirement Plan. 
A Qualified Domestic Relations Order could have been entered 
directing the Administrator of the Plan to transfer the 
appropriate percentage of funds to the account of Karen Marchant. 
Given Karen's lack of retirement benefits and no significant 
prospects for accrual of similar benefits, the alternative may 
have been significantly preferred. However, the Court failed to 
address the alternative which should have been paramount in 
looking to the most beneficial treatment available for each of 
the parties. From the Court's Orders, it is unclear upon what 
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basis and under what conditions the determination was made that 
Karen should be paid no more than one-third (1/3) of the vested 
amount of the retirement plan. However, consideration of protec-
tion of Mrs. Marchant's rights to pension plan benefits should 
have been addressed. 
C. Awarding Eight Percent (8%) Interest was Arbitrary 
and an Abuse of Discretion. 
The Court awarded Donald Marchant one hundred percent 
(100%) of his retirement benefits of $18,000.00 and awarded Karen 
Marchant $6,000.00, payable over a ten year period in equal 
installments/ accruing interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
In making the award, the Court does not address the percentage 
interest on any factual basis or tie it to any relevant require-
ment. Utah law requires that judgments bear interest at the rate 
of twelve percent (12%) per annum. Section 15-1-4, Utah Code 
Ann. (1981, as amended). The $6,000.00 award is clearly a 
"judgment" within the meaning of the statute and should accrue 
interest at twelve percent (12%) as required by the statute. The 
Court's failure to make the award was an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
In prosecuting this appeal, we have been mindful of 
Karen Marchant's burden to show error and that this Court will 
overturn the Trial Court's Findings of Fact only if they are 
contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence. On the 
issue of custody, the Findings of Fact clearly are not disposi-
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tive of the best interests of the children, underscore a 
misapplication of the law and an apparent bias by the Trial Court 
Judge and wholly fail to consider prominent bases that this Court 
has asserted should be controlling in the instant case. The 
failure to award alimony to Mrs. Marchant where it is clearly 
warranted under the standards set forth by this Court and the 
inequitable distribution of the parties' property show a perva-
sive abuse of discretion by the Trial Court Judge which has 
resulted in significant injustice. This Court should reverse the 
judgment of the Trial Court as abuses of discretion and enter 
judgment in accordance with the controlling cases set forth 
herein and the facts in the record. 
DATED this y^ day of February, 1987. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be mailed to Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, Esq., Attorney for Respondent, 110 North Main 
Street, #6, Cedar City, Utah 84720, this day of February, 
1987. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Karen Schumann Marchant, 
Plaintiff, 
STIPULATION FOR 
TEMPORARY ORDER and 
TEMPORARY ORDER 
VB. 
Civil No. 9605 
Donald J. Marchant, 
Defendant. 
The above matter was heard by the Court on August 21, 
1985, at Richfield, Utah. Plaintiff was present, with counsel, 
David L. Mower. Defendant was present, with counsel, Hans Q. 
Chamberlain. Counsel recited for the Court a Stipulation, which 
is hereby memorialized and reduced to writing: 
1. Temporary custody of the parties' minor children, 
Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena 
Marchant, born April 22, 1977, shall be awarded to plaintiff, 
subject to reasonable and liberal visitation rights reserved in 
defendant. 
2. Temporary possession of the home in Central, RFD 
Monroe, Utah, and farm shall be awarded to defendant. 
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3* There shall be no contact between the parties unless 
the same is initiated by plaintiff, save and except to discuss 
and arrange for the defendant's exercise of visitation rights and 
save and except to discuss financial matters. 
4. Neither party shall file any pleading nor do any act 
to advance this cause for a period of one hundred and twenty 
(120) days. 
5. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff temporary child 
support in the amount of TWO HDNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00) per month 
per child. 
6. Plaintiff will vacate the family home located in 
Central, RFD Honroef Utah, and willf during the next one hundred 
and twenty (120) days occupy only rental property. 
7. Neither party shall dipose of any marital assets 
without a prior Court order or without mutual consent. 
8. Neither party shall incur any debt without mutual 
consent. 
9. Defendant shall maintain in force the medical 
insurance coverage presently existing for the benefit of the 
plaintiff and the parties1 minor children. In addition, defendant 
will pay any medical expenses not covered by insurance. 
10. Defendant will assume and pay all marital debts, 
except those specifically assumed by plaintiff, including, but 
not limited to, the following: the monthly house payment in the 
amount of FOUR HDNDRED THREE DOLLARS ($403.00), the monthly truck 
payment in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS ($330.00), 
the monthly trailer payment in the amount of ONE HDNDRED SIXTY 
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FIVE DOLLARS ($165.00), and the annual farm payment in the amount 
of approximately FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000.00). 
11. Defendant will pay to plaintiff the sum of THREE 
HDNDRED SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS ($375.00) to be applied towards the 
debts to ZCMI and to Dr. Reed ChriEtensen, which debts will 
thereafter be assumed by plaintiff. 
12. Either party may have the children examined by a 
child psychologist or child psychiatrist. 
Executed on Aug„st 2J_, 1985. Q & I J ^ 
David L. ,Mower 
Executed on August ., 1985 
s Q. Chamberlain 
ORDER 
The within and foregoing Stipulation is approved by the 
Court and hereby adopted as ItVs Order, 
Executed on^u&ist: ^
 f 1985. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN SCHUMANN MARCHANT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD J. MARCHANT, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 9605 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court, sitting 
without a jury, on June 18th, 1986. At that time, Plaintiff 
appeared, together with her attorney, David L. Mower. Defendant 
likewise appeared, together with his attorney of record, Hans Q. 
Chamberlain. More than three months have elapsed since the 
filing of the Complaint by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff and Defendant 
were each called to testify concerning said matter, together with 
other witnesses. The matter having been submitted to the Court, 
and the Court having been fully advised in the premises, now 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Sevier 
County, Utah, for more than three months prior to the time 
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the Complaint was filed in this matter. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 8th, 
1967, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and ever since said time have been 
and now are husband and wife. 
3. The Court finds that Defendant has treated the Plaintiff 
cruelly, both mentally and physically, and that the parties 
simply cannot continue to maintain the marital relationship. By 
reason of the same, Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce, 
final and effective upon entry, the Court, for good cause, having 
waived the interlocutory period required by law. 
4. Two children were adopted by the parties, namely, 
Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena 
Marchant, born April 22, 1977. Pursuant to a Stipulation 
concerning temporary custody and subsequent Order by the Court 
dated October 2nd, 1985, the children have been residing with 
Plaintiff in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Defendant has been 
visiting with the children every other weekend by traveling from 
his home in Central, Sevier County, Utah, to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, picking up the children, returning to his home, and 
thereafter returning the children to the Plaintiff's home on 
Sunday evening and then again returning to Defendant's home in 
Central, Utah. 
5. In determining what is in the best interests of the 
children for purposes of determining custody, the Court makes the 
following specific findings: 
1 A. That both the Plaintiff and Defendant are good 
2 parents, and that both parties could be awarded custody of 
3 the minor children. 
4 B. That the marriage entered into between Plaintiff 
5 and Defendant was broken by the actions on the part of 
6 Plaintiff, which were not justified. 
7 C. That when the Plaintiff vacated the family home in 
8 Central, Utah, and moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, in 
9 September of 1985, she moved into an apartment and in 
10 approximately November or December of 1985, her sister, 
11 another woman who is divorced, moved in with her, together 
12 with her minor child. That the standard of living under 
13 which Plaintiff has been residing while having the temporary 
14 custody of the children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what 
15 it should have been nor was it in the best interests of the 
16 children. 
17 D. That during the latter part of the marriage between 
18 Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff became involved with 
19 another man and this fact had an influence with the Court in 
20 determining what is in the best interests of the minor 
2 1 I) children. 
^ \ E. That during the latter years of the marriage, 
23 Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and that change was not in the 
24 best interests of the family unit, but rather the change was 
25 I pursuant to Plaintiff's desires and for her benefit to the 
exclusion of the family unit. 
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6. That by reason of the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court finds that it is in the best interests of the minor 
children that their custody be awarded to Defendant, effective 
July 1st, 1986, subject to reasonable rights of visitation vested 
in the Plaintiff# including, but not limited to the following 
specific visitation privileges: 
A. Every other weekend commencing Friday at 6:00 p.m. 
and ending Sunday at 7:00 p.m., provided however, that for 
each Sunday while the children are in the care of the 
Plaintiff, the children shall be required to attend church 
and it can be a church of their choice. 
B. Every other holiday, commencing with the 24th of 
July, 1986, except Christmas at which time the children are 
to remain in the care of the Defendant. 
C. A six-week visitation with the minor children 
during the summer months commencing in the summer of 1987, 
at a time as may be mutually agreeable between the parties. 
7. By reason of the fact that the care of the minor 
children is to be awarded to Defendant, the Court does not award 
child support to either party. 
8. The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to 
alimony. 
9. The assets accumulated by Plaintiff and Defendant are 
awarded as follows: 
A. The family home located in Central, Sevier County, 
Utah, is hereby awarded to Defendant, subject to the debt 
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thereon which Defendant shall be required to pay and 
discharge, and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from 
the payment of the same. Plaintiff is entitled to one-half 
of the equity owned by the parties in said home, or the sum 
of $17,000, and Plaintiff is hereby awarded a lien against 
said home in that amount subject to payment as hereinafter 
set forth. Said home is more particularly described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04f,E for 
2483.91* more or less from the SW Corner of 
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running thence 
South along the west line of State Highway Right 
of Way, for 104', thence West for 192.31f; thence, 
North for 104'; thence East for 192.31f to the 
point of beginning and containing 0.47 acres, more 
or less. 
B. The Court finds that the farm owned by the parties 
located in Sevier County has a total net equity in the sum 
of $43,500 and Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to 
one-half of said equity, or the sum of $21,750 each. The 
farm, consisting of approximately 43.5 acres shall be sold 
on or before June 18th, 1987, with the proceeds to be 
distributed as hereinafter set forth. The remaining 43.5 
acres of the farm to be sold is more particularly described 
as follows: 
PARCEL 1: 
Commencing 1.55 chains North and 2.25 chains West 
of the Southeast corner of Section 15, Township 24 
South, Range 3 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence West 12.00 chains; thence South 1.55 
chains; thence West 15,77 chains; thence North 
10.00 chains; thence East 10.00 chains; thence 
South 0.80 of a chain; thence East 6.95 chains; 
thence South 2.13 chains; thence East 13.05 chains 
to West line of Rio Grande & Western Railway; 
thence Southwesterly along the West line of said 
railway to the place of beginning, containing 
20.74 acres, more or less, situate in the South 
half of the Southeast quarter of aforesaid Section 
15. 
PARCEL 2: 
Commencing at a point 14.10 chains East and 86 
links North of the Southwest corner of Section 14, 
Township 24 South, Range 3 West, SLB&M; running 
thence East 17.95 chains; thence North 2.88 
chains; thence East 184 feet; thence North 85.42 
feet; thence East 146 feet, more or less, to West 
line of State Hwy. right-of-way; thence North, 
along the same 104 feet; thence West 11.00 chains; 
thence North 3.89 chains; thence West 10.50 
chains; more or less, to the Canal; thence 
Southwesterly along the canal 10.00 chains, more 
or less, to the place of beginning, cont. approx. 
15.61 acres. 
Excluding therefrom: 
Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04"E for 
2483.91f more or less from the SW Corner of 
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running 
thence South along the west line of State 
Highway Right of Way, for 104f, thence West 
for 192.31'; thence, North for 104f; thence 
East for 192.31f to the point of beginning 
and containing 0.47 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 3: 
Commencing 1.55 chains North of the Southwest 
corner of Section 14, Township 24 South, Range 3 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
1.50 chains; thence North 12° 14f East along East 
Line of Rio Grande & Western Railway 4.10 chains, 
more or less, to a point 7.05 chains North and 
1.60 chains East of the Southwest corner of 
aforesaid Section 14; thence East 13.35 chains to 
Canal; thence Southwesterly along canal to Section 
line; thence West 1.80 chains; thence North 9° 35' 
East 1.55 chains; thence West 11.77 chains, more 
or less, to the place of beginning. 
Containing 7.83 acres, more or less. 
6 
C. The farm equipment owned by the parties is hereby 
awarded to Defendant, provided, however, that Defendant 
shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,500 for her interest in 
said equipment, 
D. Plaintiff is therefore awarded the total sum of 
$40,250 for her interest in the above-described property. 
To secure payment of the same, Plaintiff is hereby awarded a 
lien against the farm property above-described in said 
amount and when the farm is sold as ordered herein, 
Plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the first $40,250, 
and the excess, if any, is hereby awarded to Defendant. If 
the sale of the farm property fails to produce $40,250 to 
satisfy Plaintiff's lien, Plaintiff shall be entitled to all 
of the proceeds available for distribution at the time of 
the sale, and the difference between that amount and the sum 
of $40,250 shall constitute a Judgment against Defendant and 
shall be payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a 
five year period, in yearly installments, together with 
interest on said amount at the rate of 8% per annum. 
E. The proceeds that will be available for 
distribution between Plaintiff and Defendant arising from 
the sale of 15 acres of the farm property due and payable in 
August of 1986, consisting of approximately $8,000 shall be 
equally divided between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
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F. The 21.53 shares of water owned by the parties that 
is surplus water over and above that which is needed to 
irrigate the farm, having an estimated value of $1,000 per 
share, shall be sold by the Defendant on or before June 
18th, 1987, and the proceeds therefrom, shall be divided 
equally between the Plaintiff and Defendant. 
G. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded all of the 
personal property now in their possession. 
H. The photographs and family albums now in the 
possession of the Plaintiff are to be delivered by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant and he shall be entitled to 
reproduce any of said photographs within thirty days 
thereafter. At the end of thirty days, said photographs and 
family albums are to be returned to the Plaintiff in the 
same condition as when they were delivered by the Plaintiff 
to the Defendant. 
10. The Court finds that as of June 18th, 1986, Plaintiff 
receives as net income the sum of $1,321.00 per month, and 
Defendant receives net income in the sum of $2,114.00 per month. 
11. The Court finds that Defendant has a vested interest in 
his retirement by reason of his U.S. Government employment in the 
approximate sum of $18,000, as of June 18th, 1986, and that 
Defendant should be awarded all of the right, title and interest 
in said retirement, provided, however, that Plaintiff is entitled 
to $6,000 by reason of said vested interest. Said sum shall be 
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payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a ten year period, 
together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum, payable at 
the rate of $600.00 per year, together with accrued interest, 
with the first annual payment of principal and interest to be 
paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff on June 1st, 1987, and 
continuing thereafter on said day of each succeeding year until 
the entire principal in the sum of $6,000, together with accrued 
interest is paid in full. Defendant shall be entitled to prepay 
said amount at any time without penalty. 
12. Defendant shall be required to maintain health and 
accident insurance on behalf of said minor children, and for any 
medical or dental costs which are not paid for by said insurance, 
Defendant shall be required to pay and discharge the same. 
13. The debts accumulated between Plaintiff and Defendant 
after October 2nd, 1985, shall be paid by the party incurring the 
same, with the exception of the medical and dental bills which 
have been incurred by the Plaintiff and the minor children, which 
shall be paid by Defendant as per the Temporary Order of the 
Court dated October 2nd, 1985. In connection with said medical 
bills to be paid by Defendant, the parties are each required to 
first submit the same to their respective carrier for payment and 
in the event payment is not made, Defendant shall thereafter pay 
and discharge said medical and dental expenses. 
14. The Court finds that neither party is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
the Defendant, final upon entry, upon the grounds of physical and 
mental cruelty. 
2. The care, custody and control of the minor children is 
hereby awarded to the Defendant, effective July 1st, 1986, upon 
the terms and conditions as set forth above. 
3. That the Decree of Divorce include and be consistent 
with the Findings of Fact as above set forth. 
DATED t h i s >£X ~~~ day o f _ A u s m s i ^ l 9 8 6 , 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
dXkx^^- S/U/K 
[D L. MOWER 
Attorney^for Plaintiff 
IS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
>rney for Defendant 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
to Mr. David L. Mower, JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER, 151 North Main, 
Richfield, Utah 84701, first-class postage prepaid, on this 2nd 
day of September, 1986. 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
250 South Main 
P. 0. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
^v.v,- COUNTV 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN SCHUMANN MARCHANT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD J. MARCHANT, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 9605 
This matter having been tried to the Court, sitting without 
a jury, on June 18th, 1986. On said date, Plaintiff having 
appeared, together with her attorney of record, David L. Mower, 
and Defendant having appeared, together with his attorney, Hans 
Q. Chamberlain, and Plaintiff and Defenant having been sworn to 
testify concerning said matter together with other witnesses, 
and the Court having been fully advised in the matter and having 
made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DCREED that said 
Plaintiff be granted a Decree of Divorce from Defendant 
providing as follows: 
1. The Decree of Divorce shall bcome final upon the filing 
of the same in the office of the Sevier County Clerk. 
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2. That two children were adopted by the parties, namely, 
Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena 
Marchant, born April 22, 1977. Pursuant to a Stipulation 
concerning temporary custody and subsequent Order by the Court 
dated October 2nd, 1985, the children have been residing with 
Plaintiff in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Defendant has been 
visiting with the children every other weekend by traveling from 
his home in Central, Sevier County, Utah, to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, picking up the children, returning to his home, and 
thereafter returning the children to the Plaintiff's home on 
Sunday evening and then again returning to Defendant's home in 
Central, Utah. 
3. That pursuant to the Finding of Fact made herein, the 
Court finds that it is in the best interests of the minor 
children that their custody be awarded to Defendant, effective 
July 1st, 1986, subject to reasonable rights of visitation vested 
in the Plaintiff, including, but not limited to the following 
specific visitation privileges: 
A* Every other weekend commencing Friday at 6:00 p.m. 
and ending Sunday at 7:00 p.m., provided, however, that for 
each Sunday while the children are in the care of the 
Plaintiff, the children shall be required to attend church 
and it can be a church of their choice. 
B. Every other holiday, commencing with the 24th of 
July, 1986, except Christmas at which time the children are 
to remain in the care of the Defendant. 
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C. A six-week visitation with the minor children 
during the summer months commencing in the summer of 1987, 
at a time as may be mutually agreeable between the parties. 
4. That by reason of the fact that the care of the minor 
children is to be awarded to Defendant, the Court does not award 
child support to either party. 
5. That the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to 
alimony. 
6. That the assets accumulated by Plaintiff and Defendant 
are awarded as follows: 
A. The family home located in Central, Sevier County, 
Dtahf is hereby awarded to Defendant, subject to the debt 
thereon which Defendant shall be required to pay and 
dischargef and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from 
the payment of the same. Plaintiff is entitled to one-half 
of the equity owned by the parties in said home, or the sum 
of $17,000, and Plaintiff is hereby awarded a lien against 
said home in that amount subject to payment as hereinafter 
set forth. Said home is more particularly described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04,,E for 
2483.91 • more or less from the SW Corner of 
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running thence 
South along the west line of State Highway Right 
of Way, for 104', thence West for 192.31*; thence, 
North for 104'; thence East for 192.31' to the 
point of beginning and containing 0.47 acres, more 
or less. 
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B. The Court finds that the farm owned by the parties 
located in Sevier County has a total net equity in the sum 
of $43,500 and Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to 
one-half of said equityf or the sum of $21,750 each. The 
farm, consisting of approximately 43.5 acres shall be sold 
on or before June 18th, 1987, with the proceeds to be 
distributed as hereinafter set forth. The remaining 43.5 
acres of the farm to be sold is more particularly described 
as follows: 
PARCEL 1; 
Commencing 1.55 chains North and 2.25 chains West 
of the Southeast corner of Section 15, Township 24 
South, Range 3 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence West 12.00 chains; thence South 1.55 
chains; thence West 15.77 chains; thence North 
10.00 chains; thence East 10.00 chains; thence 
South 0.80 of a chain; thence East 6.95 chains; 
thence South 2.13 chains; thence East 13.05 chains 
to West line of Rio Grande & Western Railway; 
thence Southwesterly along the West line of said 
railway to the place of beginning, containing 
20.74 acres, more or less, situate in the South 
half of the Southeast quarter of aforesaid Section 
15. 
PARCEL 2: 
Commencing at a point 14.10 chains East and 86 
links North of the Southwest corner of Section 14, 
Township 24 South, Range 3 West, SLB&M; running 
thence East 17.95 chains; thence North 2.88 
chains; thence East 184 feet; thence North 85.42 
feet; thence East 146 feet, more or less, to West 
line of State Hwy. right-of-way; thence North, 
along the same 104 feet; thence West 11.00 chains; 
thence North 3.89 chains; thence West 10.50 
chains; more or less, to the Canal; thence 
Southwesterly along the canal 10.00 chains, more 
or less, to the place of beginning, cont. approx. 
15.61 acres. 
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Excluding therefrom; 
Beginning at a point lying N 79*53•O^E for 
2483.91' more or less from the SW Corner of 
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running 
thence South along the west line of State 
Highway Right of Way, for 104f, thence West 
for 192.31'; thence, North for 104•; thence 
East for 192.31f to the point of beginning 
and containing 0.47 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 3: 
Commencing 1.55 chains North of the Southwest 
corner of Section 14, Township 24 South, Range 3 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
1.50 chains; thence North 12° 14' East along East 
Line of Rio Grande & Western Railway 4.10 chains, 
more or less, to a point 7.05 chains North and 
1.60 chains East of the Southwest corner of 
aforesaid Section 14; thence East 13.35 chains to 
Canal; thence Southwesterly along canal to Section 
line; thence West 1.80 chains; thence North 9° 35' 
East 1.55 chains; thence West 11.77 chains, more 
or less, to the place of beginning. 
Containing 7.83 acres, more or less. 
C. The farm equipment owned by the parties is hereby 
awarded to Defendant, provided, however, that Defendant 
shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,500 for her interest in 
said equipment. 
D. Plaintiff is therefore awarded the total sum of 
$40,250 for her interest in the above-described property. 
To secure payment of the same, Plaintiff is hereby awarded a 
lien against the farm property above-described in said 
amount and when the farm is sold as ordered herein, 
Plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the first $40,250, 
and the excess, if any, is hereby awarded to Defendant. If 
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the sale of the farm property fails to produce $40,250 to 
satisfy Plaintiff's lien, Plaintiff shall be entitled to all 
of the proceeds available for distribution at the time of 
the sale, and the difference between that amount and the sum 
of $40,250 shall constitute a Judgment against Defendant and 
shall be payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a 
five year period, in yearly installments, together with 
interest on said amount at the rate of 8% per annum. 
E. The proceeds that will be available for 
distribution between Plaintiff and Defendant arising from 
the sale of 15 acres of the farm property due and payable in 
August of 1986, consisting of approximately $8,000 shall be 
equally divided between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
F. The 21.53 shares of water owned by the parties that 
is surplus water over and above that which is needed to 
irrigate the farm, having an estimated value of $1,000 per 
share, shall be sold by the Defendant on or before June 
18th, 1987, and the proceeds therefrom, shall be divided 
equally between the Plaintiff and Defendant. 
G. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded all of the 
personal property now in their possession. 
H. The photographs and family albums now in the 
possession of the Plaintiff are to be delivered by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant and he shall be entitled to 
reproduce any of said photographs within thirty days 
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thereafter. At the end of thirty days, said photographs and 
family albums are to be returned to the Plaintiff in the 
same condition as when they were delivered by the Plaintiff 
to the Defendant. 
7. That Defendant should be awarded all of the right, title 
and interest in his retirement account with the D.S. Government, 
said retirement, provided, however, that Plaintiff is entitled to 
$6,000 by reason of said vested interest. Said sum shall be 
payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a ten year period, 
together with interest, payable at the rate of $600.00 per year, 
together with accrued interest at the rate of 8% per annum, with 
the first annual payment of principal and interest to be paid by 
the Defendant to the Plaintiff on June 1st, 1987, and continuing 
thereafter on said day of each succeeding year until the entire 
principal in the sum of $6,000, together with accrued interest is 
paid in full. Defendant shall be entitled to prepay said amount 
at any time without penalty. 
8. That Defendant shall be required to maintain health and 
accident insurance on behalf of said minor children, and for any 
medical or dental costs which are not paid for by said insurance! 
Defendant shall be required to pay and discharge the same. 
9. That the debts accumulated between Plaintiff and 
Defendant after October 2nd, 1985, shall be paid by the party 
incurring the same, with the exception of the medical and dental 
bills which have been incurred by the Plaintiff and the minor 
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children, which shall be paid by Defendant. In connection with 
said medical bills to be paid by Defendant, the parties are each 
required to first submit the same to their respective carrier for 
payment and in the event payment is not made, Defendant shall 
thereafter pay and discharge said medical and dental expenses. 
10. That neither party is entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees. 
A.O 
DATED this 2 % day of August, 1986. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
S Q. CBHRBERLAIN 
ttorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
the within and foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to Mr. David L. Mov 
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER, 151 North Main, Richfield, Utah 8470 
first-class postage prepaid, on this 2nd day of September, 19( 
EXHIBIT "D" 
Karen S. Marchant 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
^ C m 5 Monthly Income / 2 Co** KJS> ^ ) % J'^-™ 
Taxes 
Social Security 
Savings Plan 
Net Monthly Income 
ZiV.lt 
~Cr 
$ u*n& 
Monthly Expenses 
Rent or Mortgage 550-00 
Real Property Insurance 25.00 
Maintainance 50.00 
Food & Household Supplies 400.00 
Utilities' 135.00 
Telephone 40.00 
Laundry and cleaning 25.00 
Clothing 150.00 
Medical 75.00 
Dental 50.00 
Insurance 30.00 
Child Care 100.00 
School 80.00 
Entertainment 80.00 
Incidentals (Grooming, Gifts, Etc.) 200.00 
Auto expenses 150.00 
Installment payments 80.00 
Total Expenses $ 2,220.00 
EXHIBIT "E" 
H^^£-_ Jrfv^tr'^Dorr ^ . l £„ /vsounu 
_T5UiJUu li 2>ZD_ f l\,OCaO v3frj>* 
\k* _ 
VUATgfe.Cou^e 
. . . L p ^ O k , - _bdA,M*vtcuA.«Jv--
^M2.v-\.Lc>u«J TZ[OO<Z P***C. .... 
.hibi.se>****. ^>Ns i -.C^a.^-CICprt U * * i 
c L v ^ Z J T G t ^ Y y 
_ JR1005. 
. "Xu^ iJ^sXi : . - K j r o -
C - U V ^ D -3?op->oCi*— 
|"5£koe>-..+ yi-b\T>-^u>-fvrE^ errc. -
. .S^^P*- * - ^ ^ — t-^cxz^c _ 
F c s O b 
CJ_£5TU£^> 
V%J2*>£>t±*<-
4 S 
4 5 
• 
S O _ 
1 S£> 
„ SO 
.. AS . 
Ac*=> 
3 t O 
So. 
I .5Q.. 
5 D 
S ^ 
\ , 2 ^ 
\,3tt> 
_14-/Oco . 
__2,oco 
....1,3©? 
# 2 37<D 
EXHIBIT "F" 
t Mower. 
2 MR. MOWER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 [WHEREUPON the Plaintiff's Counsel presented the 
4
 first part of his closing argument,] 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Chamberlain? 
6 [WHEREUPON it le Def endai it ' s Counsel pi esent ed his 
7 closing argument, after which Counsel for the Plaintiff 
8 completed his closing argument.] 
9 COURT FIKDIICGS & RULTNGS 
10 THE COURT: These are very difficult cases for the 
11 Court, in all honesty. You know I just know that you folks 
12 have sat here all day and when I handle criminal matters the 
13 whole morning, one after another where I sent four young men 
14 to prison, where probably a lot more are going to go, things 
15 J you didn't see. You didn't see the presentence reports that 
16 I examined, and on each one of them they came from separated 
17 || families, every cne of them. 
I don't justify their conduct, i n just saying that's 
what it comes from I see in those cases the sajne pattern, 
20 over and civvr again. They give nothing of themselves to 
21 anyone else, total and complete living for then1 ow i: i bene-
22 fits, broken homes, problems in school, and then It's alcohol 
23 and drugs, j crime, and then <•* 1 1 a sudden it's 
24 J! graduated into the criminal system and I fve got them. 
And then I sit and grant divorces the rest of the day on 
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Law & Motion days. Think of the number of divorces I granted 
today. Most of them are stipulations. They just come in and 
I approve the stipulations . They go out • ai id thei : eve ?r y once 
in awhile I get one like this where the parties are obviously 
good people, fatit things have gone wrong and all of a sudden 
I've got to start trying to make a decision from the mess 
that they're in. And frankly, it's traumatic to me. You 
donft think it is, but it's my i 'esponsibi 1 ity to hear it and 
make the best decision I can make and I obviously a^ m not 
going to make people happy in that job from what I find. But 
H II that's what I do as I see it. 
12 As I see it, this case basically, itfs for the best 
13 |j interest of those children and I have 1 leard the evidence and 
I have to do what I think is right at this point and regard-
less of whet*3 "he problems fall. And ppreciate the way 
16
 || Counsel have submitted the exhibits and the evidence and 
17
 || everything else. And be that as it may, this is my decision 
18
 "and I'm making it at this time. Frankly,, I'm having a vei: y 
difficult time finding grounds for a divorce, 
I1 I I he Honest 1 have difficulty with what the Plain-
tiff sues, alleges grounds. 1 have difficulty finding where 
this Defendants done anything wrong, other than slapping 
her. Maybe that was justified 1 dot l't bel ieve it :i it. I 
don't believe anyone should use force and violence. But I'm 
having difficulty. However, under the ciicurastances I don't 
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see where I can force them to ]ive together. So based on 
that I'm going to find that the Defendant did treat the 
Plaintiff cruelly, causing her physical and mental anguish, 
physical anguish because he struck her on the one occasion 
when he was what appeared to me highly provoked. Based upon 
6
 II that fact, the Plaintiff is awarded the decree of divorce, 
7
 which under the circumstances I think these parties have to 
8 be divorced. 
9 Normally, I'll leave the interlocutory* period in exis-
10 tence, but I'm going to terminate it. This decree shall 
11 become absolute and final upon the date of this entry, the 
12 interlocutory period being waived because I think they must 
13 be divorced and I see no advantage to anyone to have that 
14
 continued. 
15 The Court awards the parcel of real property with the 
16 II corrals and the 1 1/2 acres of land with home located thereon 
to Mr. Marchant, the Defendant in this action, He shall 
assume the debt and ho1d the I > 1aii I11f f 1 iarm1ess frora those 
debts and obligations. The Court finds that she has a 
517 000 equil :y house as of this date and I'm just 
going to hold that off for a moment 4 
The Court: finds that the parties have a home with 
approximately 43 acres of land that's not i disposable > which 
the Court finds is valued at $2,000 an acre and has a debt on 
it of approximately $1,000 an acre, so that the Court finds 
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there is a $43,500 value of that propei 
Now let me just make sure I'm not missing this. There's 
43.5 acres valued at $2,000 an acre with debt on it of 
approximately $1,000 per acre; that's right, isn't it? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: So that the Court tuu.li there's ',.43,500 
equity in that property that tlle parties have. The Court 
finds that the Plaintiff has consequently 1 lalf interest in 
that $43,500, or she has $21,750 equity in that property. 
The Court finds that there's another $8,000 due and each of 
the parties are entitled to $4,000 of that money. 
The Court finds that they have assets in water stock. 
The Court orders that water stock so J d at this time. It 
shall be sold by the Defendant within a period of one year 
and the proceeds 50 percent to each of the parties. 
The Court finds that they have $5,000 worth of farm 
equipment and the Court finds that there was some division of 
a household lurmfure and a .i- .t** * .oincj to say 
that the Defendant should pay <• llaintiff for the 
partlif Interest in the farm equipment the sum of $1#500 and 
he's awarded the farm equipment. 
If my mathematics are right, I'rn adding $17,000, $21,750, 
and $4 ,000, and my mathematics are con e :::t j t comes out to 
$42,750; do you agree with that, gentlemen? Check it. Well, 
that's what it is. The Plaintiff is awarded the judgement 
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1
 against the Defendant for that $42,750. 
2
 The farm shall be sold within a period of one year and 
3
 II all of tt ie pi: oceeds of that farm shall be applied against the 
$42,750- The balance will go to the Defendant. If the farm 
5
 II doesn !t bring the $42,750, then the Plaintiff will have a 
6
 judgement against the Defendant Joi the baJdui «e
 (l wtijuh wi.ll 
7
 be payable with interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum 
8 over a 5- year period, on an annua ] basis . 
9 II MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I'm sorry, five years? 
THE COURT: Five years. 
The Court makes the specific finding that the Plaintiff 
has a net takehome of $1,321 per month, the Defendant has a 
*3 || net of $2,114 a month. 
All of the Defendant's right to title and interest in and 
to his retirement shall be awarded to the Defendant, subject, 
however, that he shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$6,000, which $6,000 shall be payable over a 10-year period 
at $600 in*? yi'ai foi ] 11 yciMrs together with inter'1" I, '-i t H 
percent per annum on the unpaid balance. So he can pay it 
earlier, if he wants to, but it shall be payable in that 
direction. 
22 II MR. MOWER: Excuse me, Your Honor That means that 
23 he will pay $600 plus. 
24 THE COURT: Plus Interest. Aiid I 11 make it on an 
25 IJ annual basis, any particular time you want to. We'll aake it 
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1 on September 1st of each year, Well, this year we'll make it 
2 on June 1st, starting on June 1st, 1987. 
3 Nc: Attorneys fees are awarded to either party 
* The Court specifically finds that no alimony should be 
5 awarded to either party in this matter, 
6 The Court finds that both parties are good parents*, and 
7 both parties could be awarded custody of the minor children. 
8 The Court: does, however, find tl lat ~:\\-\ marriage has been 
9 broken up by actions of the Plaintiff, and the Court finds 
10 that they are not justified. And even though these children 
11 have been in the Plaintiff's custody since this action was 
12 commenced, by prior order of the Court, the Court is of the 
13 opinion that in the best interest of the children the custody 
14 should be awarded to the Defendant. 
15 The Plaintiff is awarded the right of reasonable visita-
16 tion at reasonable times and places. So that there is no 
17 question on visitation rights, the Plaintiff is awarded every 
18 o11 iei • holiday, commencing with 11 ie 411 i of Ju 1 y excej: >t for 
*9 Christmas where the children shall stay In the home of the 
20 custodial parent. 
21 The Court finds that the Plaintiff shall be awarded for 
22 six weeks visitation iti this summer at a six-week period, 
23 that time " wl a n i she desires. 
24 || [PLAINTIFF began crying and collapsed to the floor 
at her Counsel !s table in the Courtroom.] 
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THE COURT: Nc Attorneys fees are awarded to either 
party. You better call in the EMTf$. 
[WHEREUPON the Bailiff responded ale ).ng with family 
members of the Plaintiff and her Counsel, Mr, Mower, to help 
the Plaintiff out of the Courtroom and to give aid and 
assistance to her.] 
THE COURT: Do you want me to go forward. Counsel, 
or dc you want me to wait? 
MR, MOWER: I thmK you ought to go forward. I 
think it will be some time for her to gain her composure. 
THE COURT: AJI right. It's the order of the Court 
that the Defendant shall find findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and decree for the conformity of 11 i Is record. For 
the purpose of the record I think that I should make a record 
that the Plaintiff is very emotional because of this order 
and has collapsed in the Courtroom. 
The Court makes specific findings that the Plaintiff has 
taken these children to Salt Lake wl i;i,!e she has had them 
under Court order, that they have? been living in an apart-
ment, jointly with her sister who is a divorced woman having 
a minor child in th^ *- apartment, and the Court is of the 
opinion that the change f custody since this divorce 
action was had has been compliance? witl i tt ie normal 
standard of living and standards these parties had before 
thir; action was filed. 
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The Court makes a specific finding that the Plaintiff has 
become involved with another man and that was a factor in the 
Court's decision. 
The Court makes a specific finding that the Plaintiff's 
5
 lifestyle has changed and that her concern is basically no 
6
 (I longer for the family unit, but tor the purpos * .-..-.com-
piishing her own desires 
8
 || Now gentlemen, I want to make any findings that you feel 
9
 |j you would like me to make for the purpose of the record, and 
Mr. Mower, if you have something you'd like me to find, you 
state it now, please. 
12
 || MR. MOWER: I think it would be important for the 
13
 II Court to schedule a transfer based on the Court's order 
14 There's going to be need for a change on the custody. 
THE COURT: Has school terminated? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: On the 14th, it terminated in Salt 
Lake, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Transfer will be made on July 1st, I 
believe I better make these rights of reasonable visitation. 
I'm gojmj in male specific visitation, she shall be able 'to 
take the children every other Friday until Sunday iiiqlif when 
they shall be returned by 7:00 o'clock. So she can take them 
by Friday at 6:00 p m , r eturn them by 7:00 p.m. Sunday. But 
the children shall attend church of there choice so that they 
shall be in church in view of the lifestyle of these parties. 
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MR- CHAMBERLAIN: Your Honor, just one question on 
the date of change. The Court awarded her visitation 
continuing with the 4th of July and I'm wondering about the 
effect that might have on the children to change and I just 
raise that for discussion. 
THE COURT: Well, maybe we better make » it on the 
following holiday. 
MR. MOWER: The 24th. 
THE COURT: All right. They'll have visitation on 
the 24th. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Instead of the 4th? 
THE COURT: Instead of the 4th, Now, is there 
anything else, Mr. Mower? 
MR. MOWER: I don't have anything further. 
THE COURT: I'd like to, if you can think of 
anything I missed, I want to make a complete record. 
MR. MOWER: Nothing else I can think of. 
THE COURT: Mr. Chamberlain? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: No. I think not, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you appreciate your courtesy, 
gentlemen. I'm son y It "s bvv. J traumatic, but I, c<m't 
help that, This Court will be in recess. Thank you. 
If you']1 prepare your findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and submit them to opposing Counsel at least five days 
before you send them to me, I111 assume that they're correct 
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When I get them. So make your findings. 
2 II MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I wil1 submit them and ask him to 
3 sign them because of the time. 
4
 MR. MOWER: I appreciate that 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. This Court will be in 
6 recess, 
7 (WHEREUPON Proceedings were completed in the matter 
8 herein.] 
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